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If insurers cannot charge risk-differentiated premiums, then:
higher risks buy more insurance, lower risks buy less insurance,
raising the pooled price of insurance,
lowering the demand for insurance,
usually portrayed as a bad outcome, both for insurers and for society.
In practice:
Policymakers often see merit in restricting insurance risk classification
EU ban on using gender in insurance underwriting.
Moratoria on the use of genetic test results in underwriting.
Question:
How can we reconcile theory with practice?
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Introduction Background
Motivating example




Why do people buy insurance?
What drives demand for insurance?
How much of population losses is compensated by insurance (with and
without risk classification)?
Which regime is most beneficial to society?
We find:
Social welfare is maximised by maximising loss coverage.
Definition (Loss coverage)
Expected population losses compensated by insurance.
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Why do people buy insurance? Assumptions
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Why do people buy insurance? Assumptions
Why do people buy insurance?
Assumptions
Consider an individual with
an initial wealth W,
exposed to the risk of loss L,
with probability µ,
utility of wealth U(w), with U′(w) > 0 and U′′(w) < 0,
an opportunity to insure at premium rate pi.
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Why do people buy insurance? Expected utility: Without insurance









(1 − µ)U(W) + µU(W − L)
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Why do people buy insurance? Expected utility: With insurance
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Why do people buy insurance? Maximum premium tolerated
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What drives demand for insurance? Modelling demand for insurance
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What drives demand for insurance? Modelling demand for insurance
Modelling demand for insurance
Simplest model:
If everybody has exactly the same W, L, µ and U(·), then:
All will buy insurance if pi < pic.
None will buy insurance if pi > pic.
Reality: Not all will buy insurance even at fair premium. Why?
Heterogeneity:
Individuals are homogeneous in terms of underlying risk.
But they can be heterogeneous in terms of risk-aversion.
Source of Randomness:
An individual’s utility function: Uγ(w), where parameter γ is drawn from
random variable Γ with distribution function FΓ(γ).
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What drives demand for insurance? Demand is a survival function
Demand is a survival function
Standardisation
As certainty equivalent is invariant to positive affine transformations, we
assume Uγ(W) = 1 and Uγ(W − L) = 0 for all γ.
Condition for buying insurance:
Given a premium pi, an individual will buy insurance if:
Uγ (W − piL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
With insurance
> (1− µ)Uγ(W) + µUγ(W − L) = (1− µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Without insurance
.
Demand as a survival function:
Given a premium pi, insurance demand, d(pi), is the survival function:
d(pi) = P [UΓ (W − piL) > 1− µ] .
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What drives demand for insurance? Demand is a survival function
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What drives demand for insurance? Demand is a survival function
Illustrative example: W = L = 1 and Uγ(w) = wγ:
FΓ(γ) = P [Γ ≤ γ] =

0 if γ < 0
τ γλ if 0 ≤ γ ≤ (1/τ)1/λ
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What drives demand for insurance? Demand is a survival function
Illustrative example: W = L = 1 and Uγ(w) = wγ:










∣∣∣∣∣∣ = λ (constant elasticity⇒ Iso-elastic demand).
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Risk classification
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Risk classification
Risk classification
Assume all have same W = L = 1 and constant demand elasticity λ.
Risk-groups
Suppose the population can be divided into 2 risk-groups, with:
risk of losses: µ1 < µ2;
population proportions: p1 and p2;






, i = 1, 2;
premiums offered: pi1 and pi2 (note that pi1 = pi2 is allowed).
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Risk classification
Equilibrium
For a randomly chosen individual:
Define random variables:
Q = I [ Individual is insured ] ;
X = I [ Individual incurs a loss ] ;
Π = Premium offered to the individual.
Equilibrium








Equilibrium: E[QΠ] = E[QX].
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Risk-differentiated premium
Case 1: Risk-differentiated premium
Observations:
If risk-differentiated premiums are allowed,
One possible equilibrium is achieved when pii = µi.
No losses for insurers.
No (actuarial/economic) adverse selection.
Loss coverage (Population losses compensated by insurance):
Loss coverage: E[QX] =
∑
i pi di(µi) µi =
∑
i pi τi µi.
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Pooled premium
Case 2: Pooled premium
Equilibrium:






















No losses for insurers! ⇒ No (actuarial) adverse selection.
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Pooled premium






















Pooled equilibrium is greater than average premium charged under full risk
classification: pi0 > α1µ1 + α2µ2 ⇒ (Economic) adverse selection.
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Pooled premium




















Aggregate demand (cover) is lower than under full risk classification⇒
(Economic) adverse selection.
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How much of population losses is compensated by insurance? Loss coverage ratio
Loss coverage ratio
Loss coverage under pooled premium:
Loss coverage: E[QX] =
∑
i pi di(pi0) µi.
Loss coverage ratio:
C =
Loss coverage for pooled premium




i pi di(pi0) µi∑
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λ < 1⇒ Pooled premium  Full risk classification.
λ > 1⇒ Pooled premium ≺ Full risk classification.
Empirical evidence suggests λ < 1 in many insurance markets.
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Which regime is most beneficial to society? Social welfare
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Which regime is most beneficial to society? Social welfare
Social welfare
Definition (Social welfare)
Social welfare, S, is the sum of all individuals’ expected (standardised) utilities:





di(pii)U∗i (W − piiL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Insured population




where U∗i (W − piiL) is the expected utility of i-th risk-group’s insured population.
Linking social welfare to loss coverage
Assuming Lpii ≈ 0, so that U(W) = U∗i (W − piiL), gives:






Loss coverage provides a good proxy (which depends only on observable data) for social
welfare (which depends on unobservable utilities).
Result: Maximising loss coverage maximises social welfare.
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Conclusions
Conclusions
Adverse selection need not always be adverse.
Restricting risk classification increases loss coverage if λ < 1.
Loss coverage is an observable proxy for social welfare.
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Conclusions
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